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One thing that’s striking about us human beings is that we’re not prisoners of the present, 
like goldfish may be. We’re not only capable of remembering the past, but also of orienting 
ourselves to the far future by projecting distant aims and consciously striving for them. 
Perhaps even more than our vaunted intelligence, it’s this capacity for planning agency that 
is the key to human achievement in good and evil, from going to the Moon to killing off 
bison. It is no wonder that it is common to think that success in worthwhile projects is what 
gives meaning and direction to our lives.1  
But… what are you going to do after you’ve been to the Moon? Go there again? Go 
to Mars, and then Venus? While most of our ambitions are not on such a grand scale, many 
who realize their goals find that getting what they always wanted leaves them cold. Some 
regret that they let their lives pass by while they were chasing their dreams, even if they 
came true. Perhaps most dramatically, some people reach such conclusions at the end of 
their lives. For example, Bronnie Ware, a palliative care nurse who wrote a book on the 
deathbed regrets of her patients, says that “All of the men I nursed deeply regretted spending 
so much of their lives on the treadmill of a work existence”, while missing the youth of their 
children and companionship of their spouse.2  
 The seemingly obvious cure to the curse of projecting ourselves into the future at the 
expense of the present is stepping off the treadmill – living in the moment, feeling the power 
of now, seizing the day, damn the future. This is the stuff of inspirational self-help books for 
 
1 See, for example, Wolf 2010. 
2 See https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2012/feb/01/top-five-regrets-of-the-dying. 
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the rich and the beautiful. But there are also serious philosophical arguments to a similar 
effect. Perhaps most prominently, Kieran Setiya (2014; 2017) has recently argued that there 
is a distinctive sort of crisis of meaning that tends to arise in midlife for those who realize 
that completion of their projects only leads to ever new projects. For him, such a crisis 
amounts to a recognition of the normative defects of a “project-driven life”. The way to 
avoid them is to turn our attention from ultimately futile “telic” activities to atelic ones that 
are complete in themselves at each point. This, for him, amounts to living meaningfully in 
the present. From a somewhat different angle, Cheshire Calhoun (2018) raises doubts about 
the importance of long-term commitments to meaningful life, arguing that they may stand in 
the way of temporally local meaningful engagement with what one values for its own sake. 
 These are serious challenges to project-centered views of meaning in life, and there is 
certainly some truth to them. But I believe that they amount to an overreaction. In particular, 
in response to Setiya’s positive thesis, I argue that the kind of strongly atelic activities he 
lauds do not on their own warrant finding our lives meaningful, at least in the sense at issue 
in crises of meaning. In response to his negative thesis, I explain why when our aims are of 
the right sort and our projects build on each other in the right kind of way, there is nothing 
futile about pursuits that beget others. However, I agree with Setiya that midlife crises of a 
sort do show the limitations of this form of orientation towards the future. Understanding 
them requires us to distinguish between different kinds of meaning-giving ground projects. 
According to my diagnosis, these crises of meaning tend to arise when it becomes difficult to 
make large-scale progress in our lives towards new prospective aims for future states of 
affairs. The kind of reward we get from sustainable progress is reduced or isn’t on offer any 
more. 
 The good news is that ground projects like parenting, running a business, or 
governing a country can also give meaning to our lives, although their temporal structure is 
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reflexive instead of prospective. They are atelic insofar as they are not oriented toward a 
point of completion in the future, but not strongly atelic in the sense of lacking an aim 
external to the activity itself. Instead, reflexive ground projects consist of weakly atelic 
activities performed for the sake of what I’ll call a practice-dependent value, like friendship 
or good governance, which can be realized only in and through such activities and only for 
as long as they persist. Importantly, it is only in the context of an ongoing commitment that 
individual actions realize genuine value that makes them meaningful. In this way, even 
reflexive projects retain a distinctive orientation to the future. On this picture, meaning isn’t 
to be found in the here and now, in seizing the day. It is instead a deserved reward of 
bending the arc of one’s life in the direction of the good by building on past efforts or by 
keeping a good thing going even when the going gets tough. 
 
1. Living in the Moment? 
A good place to start thinking about the challenge of living in the moment is Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism. He says:  
Absolutely every human life flows between willing and attaining. The nature of 
every desire is pain: attainment quickly gives rise to satiety: the goal was only 
apparent: possession takes away the stimulus: the desire, the need re-emerges in a 
new form: if not, then what follows is dreariness, emptiness, boredom, and the 
struggle against these is just as painful as the struggle against want. (Schopenhauer 
2010, 340/370) 
 
Schopenhauer thinks that we’re caught in a bind: either we engage in an endless cycle of 
pursuing momentary satisfaction, or end up listless and bored with nothing to do. We labor 
in expectation of a future reward under the illusion that getting what we want, whether it’s a 
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scientific discovery or a bunch of ‘likes’ on social media, will bring relief, but in reality any 
such achievement will only feel good for a brief while, leaving us hungry for another hit: 
“Every goal that is achieved is once again the beginning of a new course of action, and so on 
to infinity.” (ibid., 188-89)  
 
1.1 Setiya on the Problem 
Kieran Setiya (2014; 2017) has recently picked up the Schopenhauerian argument. He argues 
that a crisis of meaning sets in when we reflect on the nature of a project-driven life. Here is 
how he illustrates the point with his own midlife crisis: 
I love the profession of philosophy but not with the fire I had ten years ago. The 
novelty of accomplishment is gone: first publication, first lecture, first day of class. I 
will finish the paper I am writing; it will eventually be published; and I will write 
another. I will teach these students; they will graduate and move on; I will teach 
more. (2017, 22) 
 
Setiya’s crisis results from coming to think that pursuing success in his projects is ultimately 
pointless, since it only leads to the next round in the cycle. The problem, as he sees it, is that 
we come to have a sense of “repetition and futility”, of “an apparent absence of meaning or 
significance in life” (2014, 3) regarding our own pursuits, even if we’re not skeptical about 
value in general, and even if we succeed at realizing our desires. 
 It’s worth highlighting what is new and distinctive about this worry. First, unlike 
other kinds of crisis of meaning, the issue Setiya identifies is not premised on thinking that 
nothing is really worth doing, or that we lack sufficient reason to act in certain ways (2017, 
38). It’s not that Setiya thinks his philosophical work is worthless, for example. Nor does he 
assume that we’re bound to fail in our pursuits. Rather, and this is the second point, he 
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claims that “somehow the succession of projects and accomplishments, each one rational in 
itself, falls short” (2014, 2). This is not just a psychological thesis about why people as a 
matter of fact have a crisis of meaning when they come to regard their lives as just “one 
damn thing after another”. Basically, Setiya argues that realizing one’s aims in a “project-
driven life” does not warrant finding one’s life meaningful when it’s viewed from a wide 
angle, a perspective that is detached from particular projects, because striving to realize aims 
is a “normative defect” and a “self-destructive” way of engaging with value (2014, 16, 12). 
This is because “In pursuing a goal, you are trying to exhaust your interaction with 
something good, as if you were to make friends for the sake of saying goodbye” (ibid.) Even 
if an aim is valuable, it doesn’t follow that it is worthwhile for me to bring it about, if 
achievement only exhausts my engagement with the value and begets another project. This 
challenge is interestingly different from run-of-the-mill skepticism about meaning.  
 
1.2 Setiya’s Solution 
The remedy Setiya proposes to the futility of a project-driven life is switching to a different 
type of activity, or alternatively viewing our projects under a different guise. Drawing on 
linguistics, he labels the two different kinds of activity telic and atelic. Telic activities “aim 
at terminal states, at which they are finished and thus exhausted” (2017, 133-134). Writing 
and publishing a philosophy paper is an example of telic activity, as is walking to work. In 
contrast, atelic activities “do not aim at a point of termination or exhaustion, a final state in 
which they have been achieved. As well as walking from A to B, you can go for a walk with 
no particular destination.” (2017, 134) (Linguists test for atelic uses of verbs by asking 
whether you can only “stop” the activity, but not “complete” or “finish” it.) Midlife crises 
result from realizing, however dimly, that “there is a normative defect in your life if the 
activities that give it meaning, the ones that matter most to you, are telic ends” (2015, 16), 
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because such pursuits are indeed self-defeating. But what Schopenhauerian pessimism 
misses is the possibility of atelic activity. As Setiya has it, 
We can escape the self-destructive cycle of pursuit, resolution, and renewal, of 
attainments archived or unachieved. The way out is to find sufficient value in atelic 
activities, activities that have no point of conclusion or limit, ones whose fulfillment 
lies in the moment of action itself. To draw meaning from such activities is to live in 
the present[.] (2017, 144) 
 
The crucial thing is that since atelic activities do not aim at a temporally distinct endpoint, 
the question of what to do once I get there doesn’t arise: “What I care about is fully present, 
not deferred; there is no sense of emptiness or self-defeat.” (2017, 141) When you value 
going for a walk and you’re wandering through the park, “You are not on the way to 
achieving a goal. You are already there.” (ibid.) I’ll label activities that are somehow 
automatically complete or fulfilled whenever we engage in them strongly atelic. They have 
no further telos or aim beyond the activity itself. 
In advocating for (strongly) atelic activities like hanging out with friends, Setiya isn’t 
saying that the best kind of life for us to live involves no projects. He grants that telic 
activities have final value and that they structure our lives. But he tells us to turn our 
attention from the project to the process, to find the atelic in the telic: 
But atelic activities correspond to each of the projects that structure your life. Take 
me, writing this book. In doing so, I am writing and thinking about philosophy: an 
atelic activity. This matters, I think, not just as part of finishing the book, but in its 
own right. (2017, 140) 
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So even when we do engage in projects, what meaning there is to be found is not in them, 
but in the atelic activity they involve. Note that Setiya isn’t saying that we can distract or 
manipulate ourselves by focusing on the atelic. Rather, he’s arguing that atelic activities or 
aspects warrant finding one’s life meaningful. This normative thesis distinguishes 
philosophy from mere self-help, though coming to accept it should also help with our sense 
of futility.  
 
1.3 The Problem with Setiya’s Solution 
What should we make of this proposal? Do activities that have no further aim yield sufficient 
warrant for finding our lives meaningful? I don’t think so.  
I think it is instructive to begin by asking why centering one’s life on strongly atelic 
activities would not suffice for meaningfulness, though Setiya himself doesn’t recommend 
doing so either.3 To get a good handle on this, it’s good to pause for a moment to consider 
the implications of someone’s life being meaningful. For my purposes, I only need here the 
assumption that if someone’s life is meaningful, then attitudes like sense of purpose, agential 
pride, fulfilment, agential admiration, and elevation are merited by it (see Metz 2001, Wolf 
2010, Kauppinen 2013). The problem with throwing projects to the wind and focusing one’s 
life on strongly atelic activities, then, is that they don’t warrant such attitudes. 
But why should we think that meaningfulness in the relevant sense merits this sort of 
agential attitudes? One simple reason is that if we think of people who have led 
paradigmatically meaningful lives – say, Cesar Chavez or Anna Akhmatova – we do tend, as 
a matter of fact, to have third-personal attitudes like agential admiration towards them, and 
to be inspired and elevated by their lives, in virtue of the very things that plausibly make 
their lives meaningful, such as fearless insights and exemplary acts for the good of the many. 
 
3 While Setiya himself expresses caution about atelic activities at the expense of telic ones (2017, 143), it’s not 
entirely clear why, if meaning is supposed to come from atelic activity alone. 
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Similarly, when we find our own lives meaningful, we do tend to take agential pride in what 
we’ve done and feel not just pleased but fulfilled. This is just what we’d expect, given that 
meaning in life is strongly associated with having a reason to live – and to have lived, and to 
go on living. If there’s a point to your being around, various positive agency-based attitudes 
towards you are merited, at least to some degree. 
To be sure, we sometimes use the language of meaning in other ways as well. For 
example, we may describe certain experiences, events, people, places, or objects as 
meaningful for us. What this kind of talk says is that these things resonate with us – they 
give rise to some deep feelings, not just pleasure, for example. There is some temptation to 
think that a life is meaningful to the extent that it contains such meaningful encounters.4 But 
I want to keep this sense of meaningfulness separate from having the kind of sense of 
purpose or point to our lives that wards off existential concerns (Why am I here? What does 
it matter if I die tomorrow? What’s the point of all this toil? So what if I’d never existed?). If 
the angel in It’s a Wonderful Life had reminded George Bailey that he will have a deep 
experience if he goes to see the Sistine Chapel or dances with his wife, it would have done 
nothing to stop him from jumping off the bridge – his concern wasn’t that nothing resonated 
with him, but that he had failed those who depended on him. Focusing on the aptness of 
meaning-relevant attitudes should help make clear we’re addressing the right question. 
My claim, then, is that strongly atelic activities on their own won’t suffice to make 
meaning-relevant attitudes fitting. Consider the Slacker Solution to midlife crisis, which 
involves giving up on projects like building a career and centering one’s life instead on 
strongly atelic activities, like going for walks with no destination, smoking weed, and 
hanging out with people, #YOLO. I submit that this does not help with the problem of 
futility that arises when we view things from a bigger perspective. A future revolving around 
 
4 Cheshire Calhoun (2018) may succumb to something like this temptation, as I’ll discuss below.  
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atelic activities is far from a rosy prospect, precisely from the perspective of meaning. Such 
a life is fundamentally repetitive and futile. The thought “I’m just going to hang out with the 
lads, and then I’ll die” is not really a cheerful one. It’s not that someone couldn’t find such 
experiences meaningful in the resonance sense. But if we focus on the question of whether 
our lives have a point, or whether they merit pride or fulfilment or elevation, the outlook is 
negative for the slacker. It’s true that atelic activities don’t aim at a terminal state at which 
they’re exhausted, but that doesn’t mean they’re not exhausted when they’re over. That 
nothing was supposed to be achieved doesn’t change the fact that nothing was achieved. If a 
“succession of projects and accomplishments” somehow falls short when we look at the big 
picture, as Setiya puts it, so does a succession of non-projects and non-accomplishments. If 
you weren’t around tomorrow to keep paddleboarding, well, that really would make no 
difference at all. 
As I noted, Setiya himself doesn’t find the Slacker Solution attractive. His main 
recommendation is to find the atelic in the telic, so that we can find meaning in spite of the 
ultimate futility of telic pursuit of aims. My second argument against seizing the day is 
directed against it. My basic claim is that the meaningfulness of strongly atelic activities 
piggybacks on the meaningfulness of the telic activities whose aspects or counterparts they 
are, so that they themselves remain insufficient for meaning. We can see this if we consider 
cases in which the telic activity is meaningless, or is considered such.  
Let’s start with the latter, which leads to the problem of double consciousness. Say 
you’re writing a book about epistemology. Evidently, what you’re doing is not like going for 
a walk with no particular destination – rather, you’re trying to solve, say, the New Evil 
Demon problem. In doing so, you’re philosophizing. Now you’re meant to realize that 
solving the New Evil Demon is futile and will only lead to seeking a solution to yet another 
clever puzzle, and at the same time rejoice in the thought that in trying to solve the New Evil 
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Demon you’re engaged in a superlatively valuable activity. Even if this is psychologically 
possible (which is not a given), it’s not a coherent combination of attitudes. To engage in 
philosophizing for the sake of philosophizing, a valuable atelic activity, you must take the 
problem you’re trying to solve seriously, which means you can’t simultaneously think that it 
is a matter of indifference whether you realize your aim of solving the problem.5 From your 
own perspective, you can’t be both a pessimist about the telic and an optimist about the 
atelic, if you’re a rational agent. 
Second, and more fundamentally, just as you don’t have a reason to take the means if 
you don’t have a reason to realize the end, you don’t have a reason to engage in an atelic 
activity if you don’t have a reason to engage in the telic activity whose aspect it is. Futility, it 
seems to me, is contagious. This point is reinforced if we consider scenarios in which 
someone engages in a potentially valuable activity like doing complex mathematics in the 
service of a worthless aim, like scamming old-age pensioners. If an accountant engaged in 
such activity begins to have doubts about the meaning of his life, it provides little 
consolation tell her to focus on what she’s doing at each moment and ignore the telos. It 
won’t help her on her deathbed. 
 
2. In Praise of Progress: Meaningful Prospective Projects 
So far, I’ve rejected Setiya’s positive argument for living in the moment as a straight 
solution to a sense of futility occasioned by realizing that projects will always lead to new 
projects. What I’m going to do in the rest of the paper is explain why acknowledging the 
core Schopenhauerian insight is compatible with certain kinds of projects warranting a sense 
of meaning. In this section, I’ll argue that when ground projects governed by prospective 
 
5 Gwen Bradford pointed out to me that Setiya’s solution has some commonalities with Thomas Nagel’s 
(1971) well-known ironic response to what he regards as the absurdity of our lives. Insofar as Nagel suggests 
that we should keep doing what we do while simultaneously bearing in mind that it’s ultimately pointless, I 
think his suggestion does suffer from the same problem. 
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aims link up with each other in the right way to give one’s life as a whole a progressive 
shape, there’s no reason for a sense of futility. This is to reject Setiya’s negative argument – 
but only in part, as we’ll see. 
To begin with, consider again how Setiya sees the issue. He holds that in a project-
driven life, “The way in which you relate to the projects that matter most to you is by trying 
to complete them and so expel them from your life.” (2014, 12) As he sees it, if our activities 
are performed for the sake of a future aim, they’re forever done and dusted, once the aim is 
reached. I think that this description fits some projects, like trying to reach some milestone 
just for the sake of doing so. Maybe you want to have visited Paris or have seduced a 
married man. Once you succeed, you can carve another notch somewhere – great, but then 
what, and so what? For telic activities of this kind, Setiya’s descriptions and worries seem 
apt. The same goes for what Hannah Arendt (1958) called labour, activities that serve our 
recurring physical needs. If our lives revolve around such activities that produce or realize 
nothing of lasting value, we’re right to find them fairly pointless when we reflect on them 
from a perspective that takes our life as a whole into account. 
Alas, it’s not necessarily the case that telic activities are exhausted when their aim is 
realized. Most of our projects do not aim at our having done, or being done with, something, 
and many result in something that bears fruit for the future. If I want to get a professorship, 
it’s not for the sake of having become a professor, but for the sake of the decadent lifestyle it 
affords. The activities we engage in when we pursue such aims can reverberate across time. 
What is of particular interest here are what Bernard Williams labeled our ground projects, 
the aims around which we organize the rest of our lives while we have them. Many ground 
projects, like getting a college degree or building a better spaceship, involve a prospective 
aim, an outcome we strive to realize at some point in the (possibly distant) future.  
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In earlier work (Kauppinen 2012; 2015), I suggested that there’s various ways in 
which earlier efforts can contribute to later ones to make for large-scale progress by 
improving the selection, pursuit, or chances of completion of future aims. The simplest one 
is that they can result in better goal-setting, that is, aiming for valuable goals we wouldn’t 
otherwise have appreciated. This could be because they help us see what’s worth pursuing, 
or just because they put us in a position to pursue something we otherwise couldn’t have. 
Before you studied philosophy, you didn’t know that the implications of utilitarianism for 
integrity merit sustained investigation. Your success in your aim of getting a degree in 
philosophy put you in the position to appreciate why this is a worthwhile project, and your 
success in a job search put you in a position to pursue it. When you completed those 
projects, you didn’t ‘archive’ them, but they still bear fruit for you, and if things work out, 
your current efforts will have the same impact in the future. 
The second reason why completed telic activities are not necessarily “expelled” from 
our lives is that they can result in better pursuit of aims in the future. Things that I’ve done 
in the past may and often do have the result that I can make more use of my capacities, or 
realize my potential better than I could have otherwise, and this, in turn, tends to improve 
chances of success. Think back on the time you spent in college. What did you do? You 
read, you debated, you argued, you slept late, you missed class, you pursued romantic 
attachments, you made friends and lost friends, you pulled pranks, you cried in your pillow, 
and more or less surprisingly, walked out with a degree in your hand. Some, perhaps 
surprisingly many, of these things are apt to equip you to handle the challenges of your later 
life better. You may not think about them, but they’re not expelled from your life, but inform 
the way you go about doing things right now, in the good case for the better. Had you not 
done what you did, you wouldn’t do what you do now. If you’re lucky, what you do now in 
pursuit of your present prospective aims will have the same effect in the future.  
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Thirdly, sometimes our aim is explicitly improvement over time, reaching the next 
stage in a process towards an inexhaustible goal, an open-ended ideal whose content may not 
be definable or knowable in advance, as Neil Levy (2005) emphasizes. Practicing an 
instrument is an example of this. We want to learn a certain technique or play a certain thing, 
and once we’ve completed that project, there’s always more. While the structure of this 
process is of a string of projects building on one another, and it’s hard to see how any talk of 
self-defeat would get a purchase. 
When we take the possibility of large-scale progress of these kinds into account, 
there’s no reason to think that taking a wide-angle perspective on a project-driven life 
necessarily results in a warranted sense of futility. Unlike what Schopenhauer and Setiya 
seem to think, it’s not as if we always go back to square one every time we complete a 
project – rather, if we choose our aims wisely and get lucky, we get to a new place, better 
equipped for its challenges. Realizing this should be an antidote for despair. Suppose your 
project was reading Being and Nothingness, not in order to have done it, but because you’d 
been told it’s stimulating. You’ve now completed it, and your head is indeed full of new 
ideas, and you’re ready to take your research in a new direction. It’s no surprise if you don’t 
have a ‘now what?’ feeling. Instead, you may well experience the joy of progress (which, 
incidentally, would be the title of my first self-help book, if I ever wrote one). It’s worth 
emphasizing that this is not something you could enjoy if you engaged in an atelic activity – 
without an aim there’s no such thing as progress towards the aim, or progress in your life 
overall. 
 How might one object to this sort of cautious optimism about meaningful telic 
activity? Setiya himself claims that the answer to midlife crisis “does not lie in the 
construction of a larger story into which the episodes fit” (2014, 11). I suspect part of the 
reason for his skepticism about narrative unity is that he conceives of it on the model of “a 
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consuming goal” that would make for “an overarching narrative” (ibid.). Having but one 
pursuit in life would indeed result in a “now what?” problem once you realize the aim, or 
alternatively ultimate failure. That’s why it’s important to emphasize that there is also a 
sustainable kind of progress that consists in projects building on one another. Then you 
never need fear either that what you’ve worked on is going to be discarded nor that there will 
be nothing left to do. 
  
3. Two Kinds of Ground Project and a Midlife Crisis 
I’ve just argued that leading a project-driven life doesn’t as such warrant feelings of futility, 
though of course there are projects we are unwise or unlucky to embark on. But that’s not to 
say that Setiya is all wrong. Midlife crises of a sort do show the limitations of relying on 
large-scale progress for meaning, and highlight the importance of atelic activity – although 
as we’ll see, I’ll argue that the important kind of atelic activity isn’t one that is essentially 
oriented towards the present and complete in itself. 
 So, what do we learn about meaningful lives from thinking about midlife crises? If 
what I’ve just said is on the right track, being successful at projects isn’t itself a cause for 
any kind of crisis, as long as they make for progress in our lives as a whole. Alas, there’s the 
catch. Midlife is precisely the time for many people – and this includes, in particular, the 
privileged and successful who may have no other concerns about meaning in their lives – 
where it starts to look like any progress they make is at best peripheral. When it comes to the 
important things, it’s as if their efforts won’t take them any further than they’ve already 
come. They feel stuck, caught up in their obligations and commitments, defined by choices 
and mistakes they’ve already made. If you’re an academic, once you’ve become a full 
professor, what’s there left to achieve career-wise, really? Your third and fourth books may 
contain big advances in your field, but as for your life, their significance is diminished by 
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their being the third and fourth of their kind. So it might start to look like what’s up ahead 
isn’t something radically new, except for gradual weakening of capacities, illness, and death. 
(You might, of course, lurch to the side and start another career, but that would be subject to 
similar worries, and have diminished significance in a life that is already partially defined.) 
It’s no wonder, then, that the structure of our ground projects tends to change at this 
point. After all, as developmental and narrative psychologists like Erik Erikson and Dan 
McAdams have emphasized, we face different challenges at different stages in our lives (at 
least in contemporary Western societies).6 In midlife, they say, the distinctive kind of 
challenge is not so much to figure out who we want to be or be with, but what to contribute 
to something beyond our own life.7 And that may well require not only new aims but a new 
kind of aim, or at least putting a different sort of aim in the center stage of our life. 
To understand this transition and why it might occasion a crisis of meaning, we need 
to examine the difference between what I’ve called prospective and reflexive ground 
projects in some more detail. In the former, we face a challenge that forces us to set 
ourselves a temporally distant and initially open-ended aim, whose realization requires us to 
do our best over a longish period of time to overcome various kinds of obstacle, and whose 
specification often requires us to come to understand ourselves better. Here the challenge 
could be finding a long-term partner, or it could be getting a degree, or getting tenure, or 
finding a long-lost buried treasure. Typically, the resolution of one challenge paves the way 
 
6 To be sure, this is not the only kind of midlife crisis – for example, sometimes we use the term to refer to the 
experience of encountering our finitude, or the first unmistakable signs of bodily or psychological decay, or the 
realization that some of our dreams will never be realized. Such crises call for a different kind of response, 
perhaps of a Stoic or Buddhist variety. 
7 Erik Erikson (Erikson and Erikson 1997) argued that adolescents face the challenge of avoiding role 
confusion by carving their own identity and young adults the challenge of avoiding isolation by forming 
intimate bonds with others in self-chosen relationships, and more broadly a social role. Interestingly for our 
purposes, the challenge that Erikson identified for middle age was the choice between generativity and 
stagnation. As Dan McAdams characterizes it, generativity is a matter of leaving something for future 
generations, of “[taking] care of matters that people care about” (2005, 52). Stagnation, in turn, involves feeling 
stuck, useless, or like a failure.  
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for another, making possible the kind of overall progress in life I discussed in the previous 
section.  
Apart from the treasure hunt, these are the kind of challenges that virtually all of us 
are faced with when we’re young or youngish adults. But it’s no coincidence, I claim, that 
the structure of the pursuit of this kind of prospective aim is the same as that of a 
stereotypical fictional adventure like seeking a treasure. The familiar Aristotelian story arc 
found everywhere from folk tales to movies and country songs – an initiating event leads to 
conflict, which leads to efforts to solve the problem, which culminate in a turning point that 
is followed by denouement – corresponds to the teleological structure of such projects, 
which we might thus also label Adventures in terms of their narrative mode. It’s notable here 
that prospective projects also have a characteristic emotional arc, with a big pay-off at the 
end if we’re successful. Generalizing broadly, such projects begin with a desire for the aim 
and some level of hope of getting there, the pursuit of the aim involves feelings like fear, 
excitement, and sense of competence, and realizing it offers joy or relief or satisfaction. An 
additional boost to good feelings is that in the end, you or anyone else can point to the 
finished product and say with pride or admiration: “There it is!”8 Even failure may have the 
silver lining that we at least feel alive when we have big emotions like grief or 
disappointment, and no longer suffer from uncertainty. In David Velleman’s terms, 
prospective projects come with an emotional cadence that resolves one way or another, 
whether its “an anxiety relieved or a hope dashed” (2003, 7).  
Reflexive ground projects like governing a country, parenting, or monitoring nuclear 
weapons are different, however. Instead of being directed towards a temporally distant 
outcome, they aim at an end that is realized to some degree at each moment of the project’s 
duration, insofar as one is successful, but not for good. They are thus atelic in the linguistic 
 
8 I owe this point to Erik Lagerspetz. 
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sense that Setiya uses – you can stop governing a country, but you can’t “finish” or 
“complete” governing. But as ground projects, they are not strongly atelic in being somehow 
done for their own sake (that is, having no further end) or being automatically complete, like 
Setiya’s favourite example of going for a walk with no particular destination – recall his 
emphasis on “you’re already there” when you’re just walking. I’ll say that they are weakly 
atelic in that while their aim can only be realized in and through some constitutive activity, 
and only for the duration of some such activity, their aim is nevertheless distinct from the 
activity itself. We don’t do these things for their own sake, but for the sake of some value 
that they realize when they’re done well. They have a telos that provides them with a 
standard of success or failure (O’Brien 2019), so you can perform them better or worse.9   
The values that can be realized only through reflexive projects may be called 
practice-dependent. Consider here friendship, or good governance of a country (or indeed 
justice), or keeping the flame of atonal jazz alive. These are desirable kinds of relationships, 
institutions, and practices that can only exist as long as people perform the relevant kinds of 
actions, and moreover do so in the context of a right kind of commitment that gives them an 
appropriate significance, as I’ll discuss below. A minister might realize the value of good 
governance (or, equivalently, govern well) when reading a white paper on health care in a 
bathtub or when listening to ordinary people’s experiences on the street. Stop doing such 
things and just boss people around, and you’re governing badly. 
One distinctive feature of reflexive aims is thus that when you adopt one, you take 
responsibility for something putatively valuable that can’t be brought about once and for all, 
without need for further activity.10 (In the bad case, such responsibility is thrust upon you.) 
You can, to be sure, realize the aim at a time and for a time, but not for good, as long as the 
 
9 Note that Setiya himself uses examples like parenting and philosophizing, which are in my terms only weakly 
atelic, and do not in my view fulfil the criteria he sets out for (strongly) atelic activity. 
10 For a congenial account of taking on a responsibility, see (perhaps surprisingly) Calhoun 2019. 
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task exists. If you have the prospective aim of digging a canal from Lake Saimaa to the 
Baltic, once you’re done, it stays dug. There’s no need for you or anyone else to keep 
digging it, if you were successful. But if you take responsibility for caring for abandoned 
pets in your community, someone else needs to step in when you stop doing it, no matter 
how successful you have been (unless of course people stop abandoning pets).  
When projects with a reflexive aim dominate your life, I’ll say that the narrative 
mode of true stories about it is one of Service, because your activities are not undertaken for 
the sake of some future outcome that would constitute success, but in service of the putative 
value you’ve taken responsibility for. It is a bit of a stretch to even talk about a story here, 
given how prominent the Adventure variant is in our fictions and histories. Because Service 
stories don’t involve overcoming obstacles to realize an aim once and for all in the end, they 
are apt to give rise to different emotions. Even in the best case, they won’t feature the 
excitement and thrill of the chase or the joy of finally making it. Uncertainty may never be 
fully resolved. While you will face external challenges, a lot of them are internal instead 
(while parenting, you have to find the willpower to make breakfast every damn morning), 
and there’s less drama in overcoming them. The basic story is one of persistence and staying 
the course, or resignation and giving up. 
So here’s my diagnosis of a distinctive kind of crisis of meaning that is apt to take 
place in midlife. Given the key challenges of young adulthood, our lives at that stage may 
well have the characteristic shape and emotional thrill of an Adventure – at least if we’re 
fairly healthy and wealthy Westerners free to shape our identities, love lives and careers. But 
as Service projects become more central in midlife, as they often do, the kind of emotional 
reward we get from success in prospective aims is no longer on offer, except perhaps on a 
miniature scale – getting a paper accepted feels great, but it’s not the same thing as getting a 
job or tenure, because it’s not a life-defining ground project. It’s easy to feel that there is 
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something missing in our lives when we’re no longer fighting with light sabers or wooing 
Mr. Darcy. 
This contrast is nicely illustrated by the difference between Jane Austen’s novels, 
such as Pride and Prejudice, and Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. Austen’s novels are 
excellent Adventures that end in a joyous wedding. In contrast, Flaubert begins with a 
joyous wedding. The rest of the novel is, among others things, an acute exploration of the 
difficulty of the transition from Adventure to Service. Without going into the details, the key 
to the plot is that the titular Emma Bovary can’t handle transition to Service, which in her 
era and for her class meant dedicating herself to the well-being of her children and husband. 
She was raised on romances, and expected her life to be an Adventure through and through. 
But romantic fictions end with the marriage celebration and ringing church bells, or with the 
conquest of the evil enemy. And life doesn’t. Emma Bovary hadn’t learned from her novels 
how to live happily ever after. She couldn’t adjust to Service with a child and husband (and 
who can blame her for that?), so she began to seek out the thrill of Adventure in adultery, 
which turned out to offer only fleeting relief. What she needed wasn’t another adventure, but 
a different kind of worthwhile ground project altogether. 
 
4. Meaningful Reflexive Projects 
The key question at this point, then, turns out to be whether reflexive ground projects can 
suffice to make life meaningful. After all, some people’s lives are always characterized by 
such projects, either by choice or force of circumstance, and others transition from largely 
prospective aims to largely reflexive aims in midlife, as I just observed. Initially, we might 
be pessimistic – after all, I argued earlier that atelic activities do not suffice to make life 
meaningful, and much of contemporary work on meaning has focused on projects with 
prospective aims (including my own past work). However, the good news is that it’s only the 
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strongly atelic activities that are insufficient. Weakly atelic ground projects are a different 
story altogether. Exploring this will also further clarify the difference between strongly and 
weakly atelic endeavours. 
 Let’s begin by going back to meaning in life again. I already briefly argued that it is 
at least a mark of meaningfulness in the most distinctive sense that a person’s activities merit 
attitudes like sense of purpose, fulfilment, pride, admiration, and elevation. So what does it 
take for people’s lives to be meaningful in the sense of meriting such attitudes? Currently 
most popular views emphasize active and successful engagement with objective value, as 
Susan Wolf (2010) does. Others have observed that success can’t be easy or accidental, but 
must come from exercising our capacities, perhaps the very ones whose importance 
perfectionists have traditionally highlighted (Kauppinen 2012; Metz 2015; cf. Hurka 1993). 
Such views could be supported bottom-up by considering what paradigms of meaningful life 
have in common, or top-down by considering the nature of the relevant attitudes and thus 
what makes them fitting (Kauppinen 2015). Here, I’m just going to assume that something in 
the ballpark of these popular views is the correct account. 
Our question is whether our lives can be meaningful if they are dominated by 
reflexive ground projects. And that turns out to be the question of whether we can bring 
about something of objective value by successfully exercising our capacities in such 
projects, perhaps especially if in doing so we have to overcome challenging obstacles, so 
that the achievement is difficult (Bradford 2015). The good news, then, is that this is 
undoubtedly the case if what I said above about practice-dependent value is correct. Being 
successful enough in reflexive aims – and hence doing the sort of thing that this entails, day 
after day – is how we realize the value of personal relationships or protecting the natural 
world or a healthy society or keeping the flame alive. Of course, this presupposes that these 
are inherently valuable relationships and activities, and I can’t give a proper defense of that 
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claim here.11 For some of them, one could appeal to a recursive principle akin to Thomas 
Hurka’s (2001) claim that loving the good is itself non-instrumentally good: if it is 
intrinsically good that certain types or art or people or ecosystems flourish, then activities 
that constitute pursuing or protecting such flourishing are themselves non-instrumentally 
valuable. Or: if the welfare of a child is intrinsically valuable, then taking responsibility for a 
child’s welfare and successfully carrying it out is valuable. I’m not going to worry too much 
about making this case, since I take the basic claim that there are at least some genuinely 
valuable practice-dependent goods to be overwhelmingly plausible. 
Since success in reflexive projects of the right kind is a way, and indeed the only 
way, to realize certain important goods in our lives, it does merit the kind of attitudes 
associated with meaningfulness. Suppose Lisa has taken responsibility for running the local 
dog shelter as a volunteer. If she discharges this duty well day in and day out, she’s right to 
feel competent and confident. She can handle difficult people and put mistreated creatures 
on their paws again, and persists in doing so when there are far easier things for her to do. 
She can take pride in a job well-done, even if it’s not like completing a quest to slay a 
dragon. There is at least some point to her life, and correspondingly a reason for her to go on 
living – and indeed one that is not easily exhausted. So whether she finds her life meaningful 
or not, it is meaningful, at least to some extent, even though she’s not making progress 
towards the ultimate resolution of a prospective aim – though she can still make progress in 
a different sense, of going deeper rather than moving on to the next challenge better 
equipped.   
Evidently, reflexive success that suffices to make someone’s life meaningful can’t be 
a fleeting encounter – indeed, objectivists about meaning sometimes talk about bringing 
about something of lasting value (e.g. Kauppinen 2012). This could be an achievement 
 
11 What Joseph Raz (2003) says is at least congenial to my view. 
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whose value endures, like a landmark painting, but it could also be a matter of taking 
responsibility for a practice-dependent value for a long duration. The fact that such lasting 
value is realized bit by bit poses something of a challenge for intersubjective recognition, 
however, which may explain in part why it is harder for us to see the worth of our own 
activity. The fact that, say, Lisa rescued and found a good home for Mira, a Labrador 
abandoned by the side of a highway, is something worth celebrating a little bit, but on its 
own it doesn’t yet merit much admiration. The same goes for any token realization of the 
practice-dependent value. It’s therefore not a coincidence that there is often a genuine 
outpouring of appreciation when someone like Lisa, say, retires after 20 years and passes the 
responsibility on to someone else. The deep importance of a coach, teacher, departmental 
secretary, or drummer often only becomes clear in people’s eyes when they stop carrying the 
responsibility. And if no one else is on hand to take on the task, or do so equally well, the 
often hidden importance of the practice-dependent value itself to our lives is also brought to 
light.  
It’s worth emphasizing, too, that many prospective projects simply can’t end well 
unless they result in successful reflexive projects. It’s not worth pursuing the hand of the 
man or woman of your dreams if you end up failing at the myriad mundane activities on 
which the value of a loving relationship depends. Or suppose you struggle for years and 
finally make it to the Iron Throne. After the fireworks are over, you’re faced with the never-
ending task of governing the Seven Kingdoms. If you make a mess of it, there was never 
much point in your becoming the king or queen in the first place. Mutatis mutandis – and 
there’s not that many things that need to be changed – the same goes for becoming a 
professor. As I briefly suggested, this may have something to do with the deathbed regrets of 
those who just worked and worked – if you did for the sake of your family but never took up 
your part in the family, it’s no wonder if you doubt if it paid off for you. 
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 Emphasizing that reflexive projects contribute to meaning in life via realizing 
practice-dependent values and constituting the success condition of many prospective 
projects also further highlights the difference between weakly and strongly atelic activities. 
Taking responsibility for a practice-dependent value is not “living in the moment”, even 
though it is not future-oriented in the same way as pursuing a prospective aim. Take another 
of Setiya’s favourite examples, hanging out with friends. Think of just what is involved. Say 
that what you actually do is have a barbecue and bull session. Does this activity realize the 
value of friendship? Well, it may, or it may not. The significance of this activity depends on 
how it fits into a broader pattern of intersubjective interaction, and not just on what happens 
right now. Would the people you’re hanging out with be there for you, if you got fired from 
your job? Would they call you up, if they had an extra ticket for a show? Is this a bunch of 
people who have shared the good times and bad times with you in the past? If not, it’s 
misleading to even talk about hanging out with friends. The significance of an activity 
depends on such facts about what has happened, what will happen, and what would happen 
in certain contingencies. And crucially for my purposes, the value and meaningfulness of the 
activity supervene on its significance.12 Perhaps the point could be put this way: while the 
significance of strongly atelic activities that don’t aim at anything beyond themselves is 
exhausted by what happens in the here and now, weakly atelic activities that realize practice-
dependent values always point beyond the present. Otherwise they wouldn’t realize those 
values right now either. 
 Thinking about significance helps understand the distinctive way in which reflexive 
projects, too, remain future-oriented (and thus merit being called “projects”). True, they 
don’t aim at an endpoint. But in taking responsibility for some practice-dependent value, we 
commit ourselves beyond the present, whether the commitment is open-ended or temporally 
 
12 I defend related claims in Kauppinen (forthcoming). 
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bound. As Cheshire Calhoun (2018) rightly stresses, commitment in the relevant sense goes 
beyond merely planning to do something – after all, plans are easily revised – in involving 
various attitudes towards its object and being resistant to change. Calhoun herself questions 
whether such commitments are necessary to or even conducive to meaning, given that 
carrying out commitments may well on balance require us to do things we do not value for 
their own sake on a moment-by-moment basis. After all, Lisa might not be particularly into 
dealing with managing the accounts of the dog shelter or scrubbing the floor clean after one 
of the animals has had an accident.  
Calhoun describes this as a conflict between temporally local and global 
meaningfulness (2018, 112). But I think this way of talking obscures what is going on. It is 
true that commitment will often entail doing things that don’t in themselves resonate with 
us. But to capture that truth, we don’t need the language of ‘local meaning’. From the 
perspective of meaning in life, we do need to distinguish between doing the accounts of the 
shelter just as a means of making money (as a hired hand might) and doing so as a part of 
caring for animals. Given Lisa’s commitment, her action can be thought of under the latter 
description. That’s why it, too, contributes to the meaningfulness of her life in spite of not 
resonating with her. (Indeed, she can be proud of doing the accounts in part just because of 
that.) There is a prudential conflict from her perspective, all right, but it’s not a conflict 
between ‘local’ and ‘global’ meaning, but rather between meaning and other goods like 
enjoyment. So here, once again, the meaningfulness of what we do right now depends on 





Schopenhauer and Setiya rightly remind us that success in individual projects does not 
suffice for a warranted sense of meaning in life. But that’s not because they only beget yet 
further projects, so that we’d be better off living in the moment. Rather, meaning is to be 
found in the various ways of making large-scale progress, from building on what we’ve 
learned to deepening our understanding, and in the various ways of taking responsibility for 
valuable tasks that are never completed but can be performed better or worse. Whether our 
ground projects are prospective or reflexive, what we do at each moment contributes to 
leading a meaningful life only when it’s connected in the right way to what we do at other 
moments. Fortunately, that is something we can come to realize and rejoice in right now.13 
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